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Roger J. Miner 
U.S. Circuit Judge 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 
MAY 23, 1994 
EYE ON JUSTICE 
The Second Circuit Committee on Historical and Commemorative 
Events, which I am privileged to chair, is happy to join with the 
Federal Bar Council and the Supreme Court Historical Society as 
sponsors of this morning's ceremonies. Our congratulations to 
all who have been admitted today to practice before the Supreme 
Court. May you contribute to the advancement of our 
jurisprudence as members of the Supreme Court bar and, if 
possible, earn substantial fees in the process. 
We who maintain an interest in legal history long have been 
awed by the quantity and quality of the work of the Supreme Court 
Historical Society. In recent years, under the leadership of our 
own Leon Silverman, the Society has grown and prospered, with 
more publications, more lectures and more members than ever 
before. It also has assumed increased responsibility for the 
Supreme Court Documentary History Project, an ongoing and very 
important contribution to the preservation of the past. 
I am very pleased to take this opportunity to recognize the 
very important support that the Federal Bar Council has provided 
for the various projects of the Second Circuit History Committee. 
George Yankwitt has been especially helpful to us during his 
tenure as President of the Council. We very much appreciate his 
advice as well as his special interest in the oral history 
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project that is now under way. It is a source of great 
satisfaction to me that we could all come together on this 
felicitous occasion. 
We meet this morning in majestic surroundings. When the 
Justices first moved into this building in 1935, Chief Justice 
stone is reported to have said that he felt like a beetle 
entering the temple of Karnak. 1 He is also quoted as having 
said: "Whenever I look at that building, I feel that the justices 
should ride to work on elephants. 112 The atmosphere in this 
marble temple is rarefied indeed. There is also a deceptive 
serenity here. In the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: 
"We are very quiet there but it is the quiet of a storm 
centre. 113 It is from here, of course, that the word issues 
forth -- sometimes clearly, sometimes obscurely, but always 
finally. For all who live their lives in the law, this is a very 
special place. 
The Justices always have approached their own tasks with 
solemnity, ever aware that their writ extends to a vast area. 
That awareness was demonstrated in a significant way by Chief 
Justice John Marshall, who presided over the Court from 1801 to 
1835. According to Justice Joseph Story, Marshall established 
the tradition of serving wine to the Justices during conferences 
following dinner. However, the custom was to break out the wine 
only in wet weather. The Chief Justice often asked Justice Story 
to step to the window to see if it was raining. When story 
reported that the sun was shining, Marshall would respond: "All 
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the better; for our jurisdiction extends over so large a 
territory that • • • it must be raining somewhere. 114 Justice 
story is also quoted as saying: "You know that the Chief was 
brought up upon Federalism and Madeira, and he is not a man to 
outgrow his early prejudices. 115 Justice David Brewer, who 
served on the Court from 1890-1910, once was asked whether the 
tale of the wine tradition was historically accurate. He 
confirmed that it was, and added "that the Court sustained the 
constitutionality of the acquisition of the Philippines so as to 
be sure of having plenty of rainy seasons. 116 
History is very much with us in this place, and those whose 
names were entered today on the roll of attorneys of the supreme 
Court bar have become a part of the Court's history. It goes 
( without saying that history is important to all lawyers. In the 
words of Sir Walter Scott: "A lawyer without history or 
literature is a mechanic, a mere working mason. If he possess 
some knowledge of those, he may venture to call himself an 
architect. 117 Lawyers and judges commonly refer to "legislative 
history," to "historical facts" and, of course, to "precedent," 
which invokes the past in a special way. We often make very 
practical use of history in our work, referring to primary and 
secondary historical sources, as well as to the testimony of 
historians, in a variety of cases. 8 But it is a rare case 
indeed in which a court invokes history as ratio decidendi. Such 
a case was Richmond Newspapers v. Commonwealth of Virginia. 9 
In Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme Court was confronted 
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with a scenario in which newspaper reporters were barred from a 
state murder trial on the defendant's motion for closure. The 
prosecutor stated that he had no objection to the closure, which 
was granted by the trial court. A state statute conferred upon 
the court discretionary authority to exclude any persons whose 
presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial. The defendant 
made no evidentiary showing that closure was necessary to protect 
his right to a fair trial, and the trial court made no specific 
findings in that regard. The Supreme Court identified 
constitutional error in the closure and decided that, "[a]bsent 
an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a 
criminal case must be open to the public. 1110 It was this 
decision, issued in 1980, late in the history of the Republic, 
that first announced the independent right of the citizenry to 
attend trials. The right of an accused person to demand a public 
trial was, of course, established in the sixth Amendment. The 
fascination of the Richmond Newspapers decision, and what sets it 
apart, is that its rationale is historical rather than legal. 
The Court began its discussion by observing that throughout 
the evolution of criminal trials in the Anglo-American Justice 
System, even stretching back into pre-history, "the trial has 
been open to all who care to observe. 1111 Before the Norman 
Conquest, cases were brought before the local court of the 
hundred or the county court, where attendance on the part of all 
freemen was compulsory. As the jury system developed after the 
Norman Conquest and all freemen no longer were required to 
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present themselves, those who were excused were permitted to 
attend. Records of the Eyre of Kent, a general court held in 
1313 - 1314, reported that the King desired "the community of the 
county by their attendance there to lend him their aid in the 
establishing of a happy and certain peace. 1112 Continuing its 
walk through history, the Supreme Court quoted Sir Thomas Smith, 
who in 1565 wrote that all except the indictment is "doone 
openlie in the presence of the Judges, the Justices, the enquest, 
the prisoner and so manie as will or can come so neare as to 
heare it. 1113 
Without yet a glance in the direction of the Constitution, 
the Supreme Court referred to the words of Hale, Blackstone and 
Bentham on the value of open justice. The following passage in 
Blackstone's Commentaries seems especially germane: 
This open examination of witnesses, viva 
voce, in the presence of all mankind, is much 
more conducive to the clearing up of truth, 
than the private and secret examination taken 
down in writing before an officer, or his 
clerk, in the ecclesiastical courts, and all 
others that have borrowed their practice from 
the civil law: where a witness may frequently 
depose that in private, which he will be 
ashamed to testify in a public and solemn 
tribunal. 14 
Bla.ckstone also wrote that the requirement for a judge to 
make his rulings in public "must curb any secret bias or 
partiality that might arise in his own breast. 1115 Examining the 
adoption of these concepts by the American colonies, the Court 
put forth as an example the open courts provision of the 1677 
Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey. 16 According to 
5 
that provision, the inhabitants of the province were afforded the 
right to attend freely the sessions of all courts, civil and 
criminal, to the end "that justice may not be done in a corner 
nor in a covert manner. 1117 The court also took note of the 
Pennsylvania Frame of Government, which provided "[t]hat all 
courts shall be open. 1118 Although no mention is made in the 
Bill of Rights (or in the Constitution itself, for that matter) 
of any right of the public to attend trials, the Court observed 
that "[t]he Bill of Rights was enacted against the backdrop of 
the long history of trials being presumptively open. 1119 
At the conclusion of its long exegesis on open courts, and 
still without identifying any specific constitutional right that 
might be implicated in its analysis, the Court issued the 
\ following astounding declaration: 
From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, 
supported by reasons as valid today as in 
centuries past, we are bound to conclude that 
a presumption of openness inheres in the very 
nature of a criminal trial under our system 
of justice. 20 
And there you have it! History as ratio decidendi! Not the law, 
not the Constitution, but history as the reason for requiring 
that trials be conducted "in the presence of all mankind." 
This is not to say that the Court ignored the Constitution 
altogether in Richmond Newspapers. Ancillary to the historical 
rationale, the plurality opinion invoked a number of 
constitutional sources, or, as Justice Blackmun put it in his 
concurrence, "a veritable potpourri of them -- the Speech Clauses 
of the First Amendment, the Press Clause, the Assembly Clause, 
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the Ninth Amendment, and a cluster of penumbral guarantees 
recognized in past decisions. 1121 After noting that "certain 
unarticulated rights are implicit in enumerated guarantees," the 
plurality came up with the following: 
We hold that the right to attend criminal 
trials is implicit in the guarantees of the 
First Amendment; without the freedom to 
attend such trials, which people have 
exercised for centuries, important aspects 
of freedom of speech and "of the press could 
be eviscerated. 1122 
The Court is saying here that "centuries of history" have 
implanted in the First Amendment the right of the citizenry to 
attend trials. The right was of course applied to the state of 
Virginia in the Richmond Newspapers case through the operation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
It seems to me a little strange, however, to say that 
anything so far removed from the language of the First Amendment 
is implicit there. The freedoms enumerated are articulated 
clearly: speech, press, assembly, petition and religion. 
Freedom to attend court proceedings is not even hinted at. I 
think that the right of access to trials lies in the Sixth 
Amendment provision conferring upon the accused in all criminal 
proceedings the right to a public trial. Four Justices were of 
this opinion in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 23 a case decided by 
the Supreme Court one year before the Richmond Newspapers case 
was decided. 
After the Gannett decision was issued, many despaired that 
the citizenry ever would have a constitutional right of access to 
7 
trials. In Gannett, a trial judge had granted a motion by 
defendants accused of murder and other crimes to exclude the 
public and press from a pre-trial suppression hearing. The 
voluntariness of confessions was at issue in the hearing, and the 
defendants contended that a buildup of adverse publicity was 
jeopardizing their right to receive a fair trial. The District 
Attorney did not oppose the motion. After reviewing precedent, 
the Supreme Court held to a literal reading of the sixth 
Amendment and concluded "that members of the public had no 
constitutional right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
attend criminal trials. 1124 Because it was dealing with pretrial 
closure, because a transcript of the hearing later was made 
available and because it found that any right of access was 
( outweighed in this case by the right to a fair trial, the Court 
decided that closure was consistent with any right of access that 
might be available under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
My own opinion is that the right of access is rooted in the 
Sixth Amendment, rather than in the First. The same history 
informs the Sixth Amendment, which includes specific "public 
trial" language, as informs the First, which has no such 
language. The right of an accused to demand a public trial does 
not mean that the accused can compel a private trial. And even 
when an accused has no objection to a public trial, why should he 
or she be burdened with the task of seeking access for others? I 
do not believe that the Sixth Amendment means to impose such a 
burden. I think that it confers standing upon all who seek 
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access. While it is true that the Constitution makes no 
provision for a public trial, a plan presented to·the 
Constitutional Convention by Charles Pinckney of South Carolina 
contained this provision: "The trials shall be open and public, 
and shall be by jury. ,,2s 
It is familiar lore that the lack of a Bill of Rights became 
a rallying cry for the Anti-Federalists, who opposed ratification 
of the Constitution; that the state ratification conventions 
urged adoption of certain individual rights amendments; that 
James Madison, who originally opposed a Bill of Rights, caused 
the First Congress to submit 12 amendments to the states for 
ratification; and that 10 of those amendments were ratified. 26 
What is not so familiar is that four states requested inclusion 
of a public trial provision. It is worth noting that New York 
urged Congress to propose an Amendment stating that "trial should 
be speedy, public and by an impartial jury, 1127 language very 
similar to that proposed by Pinckney. Even today, the New York 
provision for a public trial, set forth in the Judiciary Law, 
does not condition public access on the demand of the accused. 
It provides simply that, with certain exceptions, "[t]he sittings 
of every court within this state shall be public, and every 
citizen may freely attend the same. 1128 
The cases that followed Richmond Newspapers all reflect an 
expansive view of the right of access. In Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Superior Court29 , decided by the Supreme Court in 1982, the 
Court found constitutionally infirm a Massachusetts statute 
9 
mandating closure for the testimony of minor victims of sex 
crimes. A 1984 decision required that jury voir dire be 
public, 30 and a 1986 decision established a right of access to 
transcripts of preliminary hearings. 31 Just last year, the 
Supreme Court invalidated a provision of the Puerto Rico Rules of 
Criminal Procedure that provided that preliminary hearings "shall 
be held privately. n32 
It is now established for the guidance of the lower federal 
courts that closure is justified only where there is an 
overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure 
is no broader than is necessary to protect that interest, the 
trial court considers reasonable alternatives to closure and 
findings adequate to support closure are made by the trial 
court. 33 Only exceptional circumstances justify the closing of 
a courtroom. Jeopardy to an ongoing investigation or risk to the 
lives and safety of undercover government agents are examples. 34 
Even in those situations, less restrictive measures than closure 
of the entire proceedings may be undertaken. I note here that 
there are no good reasons why the right of access to criminal 
proceedings should not extend to civil proceedings as well. 35 
The societal benefits of open trials are many and varied. 
The great Holmes, writing as a member of the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts, put it this way: 
It is desirable that the trial of causes take 
place under the public eye • • . because it 
is of the highest moment that those who 
administer justice should always act under 
the sense of public responsibility, and that 
every citizen should be able to satisfy 
10 
himself within his own eyes as to the mode in 
which a public duty is performed. 36 
Holmes thus spoke to the importance of having the public eye 
focused on the courts. This is of course consistent with the 
ancient aphorism, known to all lawyers: justice must not only be 
done; it must be seen to be done. History teaches us that to 
have justice, we must keep an eye on justice. 
Open proceedings establish a more complete understanding of 
the judicial system; promote public discussion of ways and means 
to improve the law and the legal process; curb bias or partiality 
on the part of judges and juries; encourage witnesses to testify 
truthfully; impress upon all concerned the solemn nature of the 
search for truth; afford those who have relevant evidence the 
opportunity to come forward; enhance public perceptions of 
fairness in the trials of wrongdoers, and instill confidence in, 
and respect for, the work of the men and women of the bench and 
bar. 37 In view of the interests involved, I suggest that 
attendance of the citizenry in the courtroom is most 
desirable.38 
When I started out as a state trial judge riding circuit 
nearly 20 years ago, one of my first assignments was to preside 
in the most rural county in my district. Only two terms of court 
were held in that county each year. On opening day, the county 
clerk addressed all those assembled in the large courtroom. 
Included in the group were those summoned for service as grand 
and trial jurors during the term as well as a number of 
spectators and a newspaper reporter or two. The clerk introduced 
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me, gave a short summary of my background, and explained that I 
was sitting in the county for the first time. He told those 
present that he was sure that I would be fair to all and urged 
the citizenry to cooperate with me. He expressed the hope that 
the four-week term would be marked by the satisfactory 
disposition of a great number of cases. His remarks were met 
with applause, and we proceeded with the court's business. 
As we worked through the cases, day-by-day, there always 
were people present in the courtroom, coming and going. There 
were curious citizens, along with excused jurors, retirees who 
came every day, lawyers who were in town for conferences, local 
reporters and others. Always, there were people in the 
courtroom. The old courthouse in which I sat had a bell tower, 
and I understand that it was the custom in times past to ring the 
bell to summon the townspeople when a verdict was about to be 
announced. A lawyer who obtained a verdict in his client's favor 
was said to have "rung the bell," a phrase that still is in use 
in that area. 
I suppose that I was present at the end of an era. I 
remember my father telling me that in his early days of practice, 
courtrooms were places to which rural townspeople regularly 
repaired for amusement as well as enlightenment. The reputations 
of lawyers and judges were often at risk under the watchful eye 
of the people in those days. My father told me that there were 
some laymen who attended these trials who could do a pretty good 
critique of a case. Today, of course, except in sensational 
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trials, the courtrooms are empty. But there is a way to fill up 
those courtrooms and to secure the desirable attendance of the 
citizenry. That way is television. Justice Harlan, in his 
concurring opinion in Estes v. Texas, 39 written in 1965, 
foretold the future. He said: 
[T]he day may come when television will have 
become so commonplace an affair in the daily 
lives of the average person as to dissipate 
all reasonable likelihood that its use in 
courtrooms may disparage the judicial 
process. 40 
The day foreseen by Justice Harlan has come. Television now is 
commonplace in the daily affairs of the average person. No 
longer is telecasting the obtrusive presence in the courtroom 
noted in the Estes case and in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 41 which came 
to the Supreme Court a year later. In those days, the television 
equipment was cumbersome; large cameras, heavy cables, special 
lighting and numerous technicians were necessary. The trials in 
Estes and Sheppard were out of control, with massive, pervasive 
and prejudicial publicity, and the Court had no alternative but 
to identify due process violations in both cases. The indication 
then was that the televising of criminal trials is inherently a 
denial of due process. 
More recently, however, the Court came around to hold that 
television in the courtroom in criminal cases may be allowed by 
the states, notwithstanding the objections of an accused. In a 
1981 case, Chandler v. Florida, 42 the Court decided that the 
risk of juror prejudice in some cases does not justify an 
absolute ban on broadcast coverage. At issue were rules and 
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guidelines issued by the Supreme Court of Florida allowing 
television coverage of trials under strict conditions. Chief 
Justice Burger, writing for the Court, noted the changes in 
television technology since the trial of the Estes case in 1962 
and concluded that there was no "empirical support" for the 
proposition "that the presence of the electronic media, ipso 
facto, interferes with trial proceedings. 1143 Ultimately, the 
Chief Justice sent the case off on a theory of federalism: 
Absent a showing of prejudice of 
constitutional dimensions to these 
defendants, there is no reason for this Court 
to endorse or to invalidate Florida's 
experiment. 44 
Only 27 states allowed broadcasting of trials or appeals 
when Chandler was decided. The broadcast of courtroom 
proceedings is no longer an experiment, however. All but a few 
states now permit some form of television coverage of trials and 
appeals. 45 In New York last week, a special committee that 
studied the state's six-year experience with cameras in the 
courtroom released its report. 46 The committee, after hearing 
witnesses, recommended that permanent legislation allowing access 
be adopted when the current authorization expires in 1995. 47 
The program in New York generally has been considered a success. 
As in the other states, various protective safeguards are in 
place. 
And what of the federal judiciary? In September 1990, the 
Judicial Conference of the United states at long last approved a 
three-year pilot program for electronic media coverage of civil 
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proceedings. 48 Eight pilot courts were selected for the 
program, six district courts and two appellate courts. One of 
the district courts is the Southern District of New York and one 
of the appellate courts is the Court upon which I sit -- the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Media representatives must 
apply for access on a case-by-case basis and coverage must 
proceed under guidelines established by the Judicial Conference 
and local rules. 49 The Federal Judicial Center recently 
reported on the pilot program, providing an evaluation for the 
period July 1, 1991 to June 30, 1993. The report was a very 
positive one, and the program has been extended until December 
31, 1994.~ 
According to the evaluation, judges generally were neutral 
at first but became more favorably disposed to have cameras in 
the courtroom after having some experience with coverage. Both 
attorneys and judges reported little or no effect of camera 
presence on participants or decorum. The guidelines were found 
to be workable by all concerned, and the media was most 
cooperative. These findings comport with my own observations as 
Chair of the Cameras in the Courtroom Committee for the Second 
circuit. Trials were covered more frequently than appeals in the 
pilot program. I fear that appellate arguments are often very 
dull fare. The Judicial Center report indicated that courtroom 
footage was most often used to illustrate a reporter's narration 
rather than to tell the story through the lips of the on-screen 
participants. This, of course, is one of the great criticisms of 
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courtroom television coverage -- that only small snippets of film 
are used, and then only as background. It is true that, except 
for the Court TV Network and c-span, full trials rarely are 
shown. It is also true that only sensational cases seem to make 
the grade. 51 I take note of the fact that federal criminal 
trials and appeals are not part of the pilot program due to a 
prohibition in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 52 A 
Committee of the Judicial Conference is holding hearings this 
year on a proposal to change the rule. 53 
Permit me to give you my "take" on this matter. I think 
that there should be a strong presumption in favor of television 
cameras in the courtroom. The technology is far advanced and 
small, fixed cameras that operate in the normal courtroom light 
are virtually unseen. There is no reason why anyone in the 
courtroom should be any more self-conscious with the camera lens 
facing him or her than he or she is in facing any spectator in 
the courtroom. I think that all trials and appellate arguments 
should be open to television and that all measures short of 
excluding the cameras should be first explored. Cases involving 
sexual assault, children of tender years, trade secrets, national 
security and the like can be dealt with without closing the 
courtroom altogether. But wherever the courtroom is open, there 
the cameras should be allowed. 
As to the charge that the cameras will cover only the 
sensational, I say "So be it." I think that the average citizen 
gets a better appreciation for the judicial system and for the 
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lawyers and judges who make it work through the televising of 
sensational cases as well as non-sensational cases. Yes, one of 
the reasons for the bad image of lawyers and judges is that 
nobody understands what we do. I think that televising the 
guilty plea.of Tonya Harding demonstrated how methodical and 
careful we are about permitting a guilty plea. I think that the 
televised trial of Lorena Bobbitt demonstrated what juries are 
confronted with in assessing the testimony of witnesses and 
arriving at the truth. I think that the televised trial of the 
Menendez brothers showed that lawyers and judges and jurors are 
just hardworking men and women who are doing their best to 
achieve that elusive goal of justice. Of course, these are 
sensational cases, but they illustrate as well as any what it is 
( that we do. It is essential that justice is seen to be done, and 
television lets the citizenry see our justice system in action. 
Television viewers have demonstrated great interest, and their 
interest should be encouraged. 54 The televising of court 
proceedings is the best thing that ever happened to our 
profession, because it inspires confidence in our judicial 
processes. 
And one more thing while I am worked up about the issue. 
Let's get the cameras into the Supreme court! Is there any 
possible reason that you can think of not to televise Supreme 
Court arguments? Is there any possibility of prejudice to 
anyone? And wouldn't televising those arguments provide the 
greatest civic lessons the nation could have? There are some 
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indications that the Court considers that televised sessions 
would be an affront to its dignity. I think that is ridiculous. 
As lawyers and judges, we revere the Court. Yet, a recent survey 
reported in American Enterprise Magazine indicates that only 
thirty-one percent of those surveyed in the general population 
have a great deal of confidence in the Court.SS This is most 
unfortunate. I think that it derives in large part from the fact 
that the public is not fully aware of what the Court does and how 
it does it. It seems to me insufficient to squeeze spectators 
into that small courtroom to hear a few minutes of oral argument 
before rotating them out to make room for more. If the Court 
does not provide more expansive access, perhaps Congress will.s6 
The people of the nation should have the opportunity at their 
leisure and in their homes to see and hear the men and women of 
the Court and of its bar as they search for answers to the 
important issues of the day. Only the eye of the camera can 
provide that opportunity, for in these times it is the principal 
eye on justice. 
18 
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